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What	Works	in	Security	Interventions:	Rethinking
DDR	in	Today’s	Violent	Conflicts
by	Tatiana	Carayannis	and	Aaron	Pangburn
This	post	was	inspired	by	Tatiana’s	Carayannis	presentation	at	a	panel	discussion	entitled	“The	Changing
Landscape	of	Armed	Groups:	Doing	DDR	in	New	Contexts”	on	1	May	2018	in	New	York.	The	World	Bank	Group,
UN	Department	of	Peacekeeping	and	the	Social	Science	Research	Council	organized	the	event,	and	the	meeting
note	can	be	found	here.
Violent	conflict	has	become	an	increasingly	complex	phenomenon.	Recognizable	patterns	of	armed	threats	in
conflict	settings	have	given	way	to	complicated	interactions	involving	non-state	armed	groups,	criminal	gangs,	drug
traffickers,	and	terrorists.	The	territory	within	which	these	groups	operate	has	also	become	more	complex,	from	the
communications	and	weapons	technologies	they	use,	to	their	internationally-networked	connections.
As	a	result,	responses	to	violent	conflict	are	in	flux,	including	in	the	area	of	disarmament,	demobilization	and
reintegration	(DDR).	How	can	we	effectively	undertake	DDR	interventions	in	these	new	contexts?	DDR	has	more
than	a	“branding	problem”	as	a	P5	ambassador	described	it	in	Bangui	in	2012,	just	before	the	country	descended
into	one	of	its	deadliest	cycles	of	violence	to	date.
Part	of	the	challenge	is	in	differentiating	between	conflict	and	violence.	Although	the	terms	may	sometimes	be
used	interchangeably,	it	is	helpful	to	separate	out	their	different	dynamics.	Conflict	itself	is	found	in	every	society;
violence	may	be	an	expression	of	conflict	but	it	can	also	prevent	the	public	management	of	conflict	itself.	Conflict
can	facilitate	violence,	but	the	forces	that	drive	violence	are	unlikely	to	be	identical	to	those	which	spark	conflict.
Violence	is	sometimes	present	without	intra-state	conflict,	as	we	see	in	various	locations	in	Latin	and	Central
America.	The	armed	groups	that	produce	enormous	violence	in	parts	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	are
often	engaged	in	extortion	and	other	rent-seeking	activities	rather	than	war.	Researchers	increasingly	recognize	the
importance	of	responding	to	violence	as	a	distinct	phenomenon.
Research	and	policy	responses	argue	for	the	importance	of	targeting	the	local	drivers	of	conflict.	Interventions	in
places	like	the	DRC	and	Afghanistan	have	therefore	aimed	to	engage	with	local	contexts—and	yet	such
interventions	have	still	been	notoriously	ineffective.	Their	failures	reveal	that	it	is	necessary	to	understand	the
multiple	scales	of	violence.	While	violence	is	carried	out	on	a	local	level,	actors	who	are	competing	for	power	often
think	globally:	they	are	linked	to	national	and	international	networks.	Responses	to	violence	that	limit	themselves	to
local	conflicts	miss	these	large-scale	international	connections.	Moreover,	an	overemphasis	on	local	or	cultural
primacy	risks	romanticizing	the	local,	which	can	become	a	pretext	for	exclusion	or	ethnonationalism.
In	the	meantime,	as	we	pay	increasing	attention	to	the	role	of	non-state	actors	in	these	networks	of	violence,	the
state	is	still	present,	either,	in	the	words	of	Central	African	Republic	(CAR)	scholar	Stephen	Smith,	in	its	hurtful
presence	or	in	its	painful	absence.1	Armed	groups	like	those	in	the	DRC	or	CAR	can	take	on	the	roles	of	a	state,
such	as	taxation	and	the	provision	of	security,	endowing	them	with	practical	legitimacy.	The	idea	of	the	state	is	still
powerful,	despite	the	effective	weakness	of	the	state	itself	in	these	contexts.	In	many	cases,	armed	groups	are
performative	of	the	state—they	employ	symbols	of	state,	and	provide	public	good	like	justice	and	security	even
when	this	is	contested	or	exclusionary.	As	we	see	in	DRC,	despite	the	presence	of	over	100-armed	groups,	there	is
still	a	demand	for	the	state,	and	demand	for	better	governance.
What	these	dynamics	indicate	is	that	conventional	conceptual	boundaries	are	being	transgressed.	The	borders
around	public	and	private	or	local	and	national	are	no	longer	clear.	We	need	interdisciplinary	and	transregional
approaches	to	respond	to	these	issues	of	conflict	and	violence.
What,	then,	are	the	implications	for	DDR?	What	practical	steps	can	we	take	to	operationalize	these	insights	to	meet
the	demands	of	DDR	interventions?
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First,	DDR	practitioners	need	to	accept	that	they	will	need	to	engage	with
an	increasingly	wide	range	of	actors.	As	conflicts	become	more	complex
and	diffuse,	it	is	necessary	to	connect	with	a	broader	range	of	groups	and
communities,	including	non-state	armed	groups,	customary	authorities,
religious	extremists,	and	others.	This	helps	to	avoid	the	pitfalls	posed	by
strengthening	one	actor	at	the	expense	of	others,	or	removing	a	single	group
from	an	interconnected	landscape,	for	the	maintenance	of	long-term
security.
Second,	DDR	must	be	understood	as	a	political	process.	As	much	as	it	is
acknowledged	that	DDR	is	political,	interventions	persist	in	treating	it	as	a
technical	exercise.	DDR	interventions	would	do	well	to	reflect	the	political
complexities	of	the	violent	conflicts	they	are	addressing.	The	wide
engagement	described	above	and	the	need	for	an	evidentiary	assessment
will	help	in	this	endeavor.	Moreover,	we	need	to	understand	connections
between	local,	national,	regional,	and	transnational	actors.2	If	DDR
programs	aim	to	successfully	sever	ex-combatants	from	their	war	networks,
it	cannot	restrict	its	considerations	to	only	the	local	scale.
Third,	this	may	also	require	us	to	rethink	incentive	structures	for	armed
groups	to	put	down	their	guns.	As	we	have	seen	in	DRC,	CAR,	South	Sudan
and	countless	other	countries,	incentives	in	DDR	programs	to	date	incentivize	a	spike	in	violence,	inflation	in	the
numbers	of	armed	groups	in	anticipation	of	what	is	widely	seen	as	a	revenue-generation	process,	and	heightened
expectations	of	what	are	often	poorly	or	not	implemented	DDR	programs.	Rather	than	the	carrot	being	integrated
into	the	national	army,	or	some	form	of	remuneration	to	facilitate	reinsertion	into	civilian	life,	we	need	to	hold	armed
groups	responsible	for	the	security	of	the	communities	they	often	claim	to	provide	as	the	first	step	in	any	DDR
process.	The	incentive	is	to	reduce	the	violence	in	return	for	eventual	participation	in	an	integration	or	reinsertion
process.	This	is	an	interim	step	in	any	project	to	extend	state	authority,	which	itself	is	a	long	term	process.	Some
will	balk	at	this	and	claim	that	this	just	legitimizes	the	armed	actors	we	are	trying	to	eradicate.	What	they	miss,
however,	is	that	many	of	these	armed	actors	already	enjoy	some	legitimacy	even	if	they	use	coercive	tactics.	They
are	part	of	the	competition	of	public	authority	in	their	communities.3	Moreover,	this	does	not	legitimate	them	any
more	than	inviting	them	as	spoilers,	to	the	negotiating	table	–	a	common	practice	in	international	mediation.
Fourth,	and	very	much	related	to	the	point	about	rethinking	incentive	structures	above,	is	that	we	need	to	pursue
evidence-based	approaches	in	DDR.	We	need	to	better	understand	who	actually	provides	security	for	local
communities,	and	who	is	understood	as	the	local	authority	at	any	given	time.	In	other	words,	we	need	to	understand
how	armed	actors	are	socially	embedded,	and	who	provides	everyday	security	and	how,	rather	than	assume	that
armed	actors	are	simply	coercive	actors	and	potential	spoilers	in	a	peace	process.	This	is	impossible	without
investing	in	the	research	and	analysis	that	provides	this	evidence.	Partnerships	with	research	communities	will	be
essential	as	this	type	of	granular,	evidence-based	research	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	UN	and	DDR	practitioners.
This	includes	a	better	understanding	of	the	social	support	networks	of	armed	actors,	which	ones	would	need	to	be
cut	and	which	ones	retained	to	best	support	ex-combatants’	reinsertion.	This	will	allow	us	to	better	understand	what
networks	are	merely	criminalized	enterprises	and	what	networks	are	essential	support	networks	to	sustain	ex-
combatants	in	the	difficult	transition	to	civilian	life.	As	some	have	shown,4	maintaining	support	structures	in	some
contexts	leads	to	more	successful	reintegration	into	civilian	life	as	ex-combatants	bring	with	them	their	own	support
networks.
Fifth,	we	need	a	new	research	agenda	to	support	DDR	processes.	We	need	to	also	expand	our	metrics	of
evaluation	for	demobilized	combatants.	While	questions	about	job	security	or	social	acceptance	are	measurable,
they	remain	less	relevant	than	those	that	take	into	consideration	the	deep	political	nature	of	DDR.	Instead,	we
should	ask	questions	that	help	us	understand	under	what	conditions	ex-combatants	become	targets	for
remobilization	and	how	their	return	to	civilian	life	affects	local	governance	structures,	or	whether	their	return	spurs
local	communities	to	make	claims	for	justice.	Ongoing	research	by	the	SSRC	and	its	partners,	for	example,	is
interviewing	up	to	400	former	combatants	in	DRC	to	better	understand	their	process	and	challenges	of	return	and
reinsertion,	and	the	impact	on	public	authority.
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These	points	offer	a	starting	point	to	update	the	international	community’s	conflict	response	toolbox.	In	order	to
effectively	respond	to	the	challenges	posed	for	DDR	by	the	contemporary	world’s	complex	conflicts,	we	must
rethink	how	we	understand	the	nature	of	these	conflicts	and	the	violence	that	attends	them.	This	will	allow	us	to
more	closely	align	DDR	responses	to	the	environments	in	which	they	must	operate.
The	featured	image	for	this	blog	that	appears	on	the	homepage	was	taken	by	Tatiana	Carayannis,	titled	“Everyday
market	scenes	in	Gemena,	DRC.	2018”.
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